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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, JUSTICE KENNEDY, AND
THE VIRTUES OF THE MIDDLE GROUND
Allen Rostron*
When the Supreme Court hears arguments this fall about the
constitutionality of affirmative action policies at the University of Texas,1
attention will be focused once again on Justice Anthony Kennedy. With the
rest of the Court split between a bloc of four reliably liberal jurists and an
equally solid cadre of four conservatives, the spotlight regularly falls on
Kennedy, the swing voter that each side in every closely divided and
ideologically charged case desperately hopes to attract. Critics condemn
Kennedy for having an unprincipled, capricious, and self-aggrandizing style
of decision-making.2 Though he is often decisive in the sense of casting the
crucial vote that determines a case’s outcome, his opinions can be
maddeningly indecisive in the sense of failing to establish clear rules of
law. Yet in Fisher v. University of Texas, Kennedy’s irresolute nature may
prove to be a blessing. By taking a middle-ground position that significantly
sharpens judicial scrutiny of affirmative action programs but does not
absolutely bar them, Kennedy can finesse the issue in a way that
accommodates the American public’s conflicted feelings about racial
preferences, but simultaneously forces everyone to start thinking more
seriously about how racial components of affirmative action can be phased
out in a manner that will minimize disruption and bitterness.
I. A PATTERN OF SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE
If Justice Kennedy winds up casting the deciding vote in Fisher, it will
not be the first time that a middle-ground position taken by a single judge is
decisive in a key Supreme Court case about affirmative action. When the
Court first tackled the issue in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,3 Lewis Powell was the Justice who held sway. In that case, Allan
Bakke, a white male, claimed that the medical school at the University of
*
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California at Davis impermissibly discriminated against him by reserving
sixteen out of one hundred seats in each entering class for applicants from
disadvantaged minority groups.4 Four members of the Supreme Court
thought the medical school’s admissions policy violated federal law,5 while
four others saw no legal flaw in the school’s approach.6 That left Justice
Powell to break the tie. While declaring that the medical school violated the
Equal Protection Clause by fixing a rigid quota for minority students,
Powell explained that he would approve a policy under which an
applicant’s contribution to the school’s racial or ethnic diversity would be
merely a “plus” factor in evaluating the applicant’s admission file.7
A quarter of a century later, the Supreme Court returned to the question
of affirmative action in a pair of cases involving the University of
Michigan.8 At Michigan’s undergraduate College of Arts and Sciences, the
admissions formula specified that an applicant from an underrepresented
minority group would receive a 20-point boost toward the 100 points
needed to guarantee admission.9 Michigan Law School, on the other hand,
used no fixed formula or point system, but took the race of applicants into
account to ensure the enrollment of a “critical mass” of minority students.10
While most Supreme Court Justices saw no constitutionally significant
difference between the college’s point system and the law school’s nonnumeric method, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer
distinguished the two—casting the pivotal votes to strike down the
undergraduate college’s points-based policy but to uphold the law school’s
more flexible and vague approach. Justice O’Connor added an unusual twist
to her opinion by noting that it had been twenty-five years since Justice
Powell’s landmark opinion in Bakke, and forecasting “that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary” to ensure
sufficient racial diversity in public universities.11 The Michigan cases thus
represented “the apogee of split-the-difference pragmatism” rather than a
clear victory for either side of the affirmative action debate.12
More recently, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1, the Supreme Court looked at race-based policies at
the elementary and high school levels.13 Four Justices scoffed at the notion
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that race should ever be a factor in deciding which pupils attend which
schools within a district, flatly declaring that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.”14 On the other hand, four Justices applauded the notion that a school
district would make race a factor in school assignments in order to fulfill
the promise of racial integration and to achieve a more level racial
distribution across all schools within the district.15 Justice Kennedy emerged
as the lone occupant of a middle ground; he provided the fifth vote for
striking down the particular school district policies but declined to rule out
the possibility that a school district could craft a race-conscious assignment
policy that would remain safely within constitutional boundaries.16
II. THE TEXAS SHOWDOWN
While Justice O’Connor predicted that the use of racial preferences in
higher education would be obsolete twenty-five years after Grutter and
Gratz, many now wonder if affirmative action will survive that long. When
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fisher, widespread speculation
ensued about whether the Court’s decision would mean the end of
affirmative action.17
The University of Texas has two principal mechanisms to increase the
racial and ethnic diversity of its student body. First, the state’s “Top Ten
Percent Law” provides for automatic admission of Texas high school
seniors with grade point averages in the top tenth of their graduating
classes.18 Second, in evaluating all other applications, the University uses a
“holistic” approach that considers race as one of the “special
circumstances” that can boost an applicant’s “personal achievement
score.”19 Although the “Top Ten Percent Law” is superficially race-neutral,
it has the purpose and effect of substantially increasing minority enrollment.
It provides a route to admission without regard for standardized test
scores20—which generally have been lower among minority students—and
it takes advantage of persistent patterns of segregation where AfricanAmerican and Hispanic students in Texas live and go to high school.21 In
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the lawsuit now pending before the Supreme Court, the challengers have
not questioned the constitutionality of the “Top Ten Percent Law.” Instead
they have focused their attack solely on the holistic, multi-factor approach
to diversity that the University of Texas uses to assess the applicant pool
remaining after applying the “Top Ten Percent Law.”22 The petitioners
assert that—like the points-based policy in Gratz—the University of
Texas’s “personal achievement score” is impermissibly automatic in its
application and decisive in its effect on admissions decisions.23
Fears that Fisher will bring the end of affirmative action have been
exacerbated by the fact that Justice Elena Kagan—a member of the
Supreme Court’s four-vote liberal bloc—will not participate in deciding the
case. Kagan recused herself because she was the U.S. Solicitor General
when the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in the case.24 But
while Kagan’s absence might seem like a blow to proponents of affirmative
action, it is actually unlikely to matter. If Kagan chose to participate in the
case, the University of Texas would need five votes to prevail. The
University would count on the support of Kagan and the Court’s other three
liberals (Stephen Breyer, Ruth Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor) and it
would hope that Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote for
upholding the University’s affirmative action program. With Kagan not
participating in the case, the University instead needs only four votes to
win. That is because the Court will be reviewing a Fifth Circuit decision
that upheld the University of Texas policies. In the event of a 4–4 tie, the
Court would simply announce that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was affirmed
by an evenly divided court.25 Constitutional law would not be altered, and
precedents like Grutter would escape unscathed. But again, to achieve that
4–4 tie, the University needs to garner Justice Kennedy’s vote. In other
words, Justice Kennedy’s vote would carry the day regardless of whether
Kagan participates in the case.
Anthony Kennedy is thus the University’s only hope, and that hope is
exceedingly dim. Kennedy did not like the Michigan law school’s policy in
Grutter, and there is little reason to think he will feel differently about the
Texas version of the same basic holistic-review-to-get-a-critical-mass
approach. If anything, the challenged Texas policy may look even worse to
Kennedy than what he denounced in Grutter, given that it has a
numerical—or “points”—component that the Grutter policy lacked and this
component kicks in after the state’s “Top Ten Percent Law” has already
22
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24
See Hans A. von Spakovsky, UT’s Missing Brief and Justice Kagan’s Recusal, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/281465/uts-missing-brief-andjustice-kagan-s-recusal-hans-von-spakovsky (link).
25
See Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 643, 646 (2002) (link).
23

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/11/

77

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

provided a large dose of diversity enhancement for the University of
Texas’s incoming class.
While it thus seems likely that the University of Texas policy will be
struck down, the larger question is whether Justice Kennedy will simply
denounce the Texas approach or instead go further and join the Court’s
conservative quartet in putting a stop to affirmative action across the board.
Based on Kennedy’s opinions in previous cases, the answer would be no.
Although repeatedly voting with the conservatives in affirmative action
cases, Kennedy has always conspicuously avoided signing on to more
sweeping denunciations of all government consideration of race. In Grutter,
he scorned the Michigan law school’s policy for pretending to consider all
types of diversity while really being nothing more than a racial quota in a
holistic disguise.26 But at the same time, he noted that “[t]here is no
constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor
among many others to achieve diversity.”27 Likewise, in Parents Involved,
Kennedy voted to strike down the particular student/school assignment
policies before the Court, but rejected his conservative colleagues’ “all-toounyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my
view, it may be taken into account.”28 Kennedy encouraged school districts
to improve the racial balance of their schools in general ways, such as
paying attention to race when choosing sites for new school buildings and
when drawing up attendance zones, rather than by making race a factor in
the individualized determinations about what school a particular student
would attend.29
Of course, Justice Kennedy might make a surprising turn to the left or
right in Fisher. He might decide that even though he dissented in Grutter,
that precedent now has the weight of stare decisis behind it, and it would be
better for the Court to stand pat and let the remaining time run on Justice
O’Connor’s 25-year clock. On the other hand, he might decide to eradicate
affirmative action entirely, figuring that it is better to firmly shut the door to
it rather than leave even a small crack through which government officials
will continually try to squeeze too much. But the most likely outcome is
that Kennedy will once again arrive at a middle ground, refusing to put a
complete stop to affirmative action, but insisting that government officials
must finally realize that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply.

26
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III. SOMEWHERE BETWEEN ALL AND NOTHING
The disadvantages of that sort of middle-ground outcome are obvious.
No matter how hard Justice Kennedy might try to explain his views, he
would be taking a position significantly more nuanced than simply saying
“anything short of a full-blown quota is permissible” or “the Constitution
requires complete color-blindness.” The waters inevitably will be muddied,
leaving government officials and lower court judges to puzzle over exactly
what Kennedy thinks the Constitution permits. Kennedy will be condemned
again for failing to spell out a sufficiently clear and comprehensive set of
requirements and restrictions. As Dahlia Lithwick whimsically imagined
after the oral argument in Parents United, protestors might swarm the
Supreme Court plaza to chant, “Two-four-six-eight, Justice Kennedy, make
up some constitutional rules—you’re driving us freakin’ crazy.”30
Yet that sort of frustration and uncertainty might be a price worth
paying. Affirmative action is an issue about which many Americans have
ambivalent, inconsistent feelings. Public opinion polls show that a strong
majority of Americans favor affirmative action programs, but at the same
time oppose racial preferences by an equally wide margin.31 This seeming
contradiction results in part from ambiguity about the meaning of
“affirmative action.”32 For example, that term could include efforts to
encourage more minority students to apply to a university, without giving
them any advantage when evaluating their applications. But the poll
numbers also reflect a real struggle going on in many hearts and minds, as
people try to reconcile their desire for racial equality with their commitment
to judging individuals by merit.33 In one poll, only 36 percent of Americans
said that affirmative action programs giving preferences to blacks and other
minorities should be continued,34 but a few weeks later another poll found
that 63 percent of Americans think such programs should be continued as
long as they do not involve rigid quotas.35 Slight differences in the wording
30
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of poll questions produce wild swings in the results because many
Americans remain deeply conflicted about the issue, troubled by affirmative
action but also wary of the consequences of wiping it away entirely.
Thanks to swing voters like Lewis Powell, Sandra Day O’Connor, and
Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court so far has avoided giving a simple
“yes” or “no” answer to the affirmative action question. Instead, the
constitutional rule has been, “it depends.” While that is not the most
definitive or clear way to resolve the issue, it has created the opportunity to
wait and see how much progress would be made in overcoming racial
hostilities and disparities and to look for approaches that might best
reconcile the competing interests at stake. In essence, even when the vote at
the Supreme Court was nominally 5 to 4, the swing voters’ cautious,
tempered approach ensured that the decision was really more of a 4½ to 4½
balancing act.
Of course, the Supreme Court’s task is to interpret the Constitution
rather than to follow public opinion polls. And on some issues, it will not be
possible to give each side half a loaf. But where the Court and the nation
are closely divided and a reasonable middle ground does exist, there is
surely some value in the Court reaching a result that roughly corresponds to
the median of the American public’s sentiments. Such a result at least lends
legitimacy to the Court’s decisions in the eyes of the public. Moreover, the
need for legitimacy may be particularly great in Fisher, given that it will be
decided a year after the Supreme Court’s highly controversial ruling about
the fate of the federal health care reform legislation.36
When asked about the future of affirmative action, Barack Obama has
acknowledged that it makes little sense to dwell on race alone. His
daughters, for example, have enjoyed a privileged upbringing and would
not deserve an advantage when they apply to college.37 The challenge,
Obama recognized, is to move toward more sophisticated forms of
affirmative action that take account of the persistent effects of racial
discrimination but that do so by broadly considering all the circumstances
that a person of any race has faced and the difficulties overcome.38
When the Supreme Court decides Fisher, Justice Kennedy will have
the chance to tell the nation that it is time to get serious about putting
Obama’s prescription into practice. By making clear that judicial scrutiny of
affirmative action policies will be genuinely strict, Kennedy can force
governments to be more careful and selective about their reliance on race
and to begin phasing out the use of racial distinctions where they are not
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truly necessary. At the same time, by refusing to condemn categorically
every form of race-based affirmative action, Kennedy can underscore that
constitutional law will remain sensitive to the difficulties created by the
profound role that race has played, and continues to play, in American
society. The middle ground is not pure, neat, or simple, but sometimes it is
the best place to stand.
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